By Henry Habberley Price
Read or Download Belief (Muirhead Library of Philosophy) PDF
Similar epistemology books
Luigi Gioia offers a clean description and research of Augustine's enormous treatise, De Trinitate, engaged on a supposition of its team spirit and its coherence from structural, rhetorical, and theological issues of view. the most arguments of the treatise are reviewed first: Scripture and the secret of the Trinity; dialogue of 'Arian' logical and ontological different types; a comparability among the method of information and formal features of the confession of the secret of the Trinity; an account of the so known as 'psychological analogies'.
During this very important new textual content, Keith Lehrer introduces scholars to the foremost conventional and modern debts of understanding. starting with the conventional definition of data as justified real trust, Lehrer explores the reality, trust, and justification stipulations with the intention to an intensive exam of origin theories of information, externalism and naturalized epistemologies, and internalism and sleek coherence theories in addition to fresh reliabilist and causal theories.
Richard Swinburne deals an unique remedy of a query on the center of epistemology: what makes a trust rational, or justified in preserving? He maps the rival bills of philosophers on epistemic justification ("internalist" and "externalist"), arguing that they're rather debts of other innovations.
In recent times there was a growing to be acceptance mature research of clinical and technological task calls for an figuring out of its spatial contexts. This booklet brings jointly participants with assorted pursuits to ascertain the spatial foundations of the sciences from a couple of complementary views.
- The Rediscovery of Common Sense Philosophy
- Mantzavinos - Naturalistic Hermeneutics
- The Aim of Belief
- The Epistemology of Belief
Additional resources for Belief (Muirhead Library of Philosophy)
But it is not necessary to consider this studious sort of introspection. Let us confine ourselves to what one might call ordinary introspection, the attentive awareness of some present content of our own minds. This occurs sometimes in nearly everyone (even, perhaps, in the most behaviouristic psychologist), though more frequently in some persons than in others. Is it a form of knowledge by acquaintance? And if we say it is, shall we be using the term 'knowledge by acquaintance' in a technical sense, or in its ordinary everyday sense?
The two features mentioned just now, first-handness and familiarity, are both present. No one else can tell us what it is like for something to be red, or to be inside something else. Nor can we find this out by inference. We have to see it for ourselves, by actual face-to-face inspection of instances. Moreover, knowing what it is like for something to be red, or inside something else, has the other characteristic which I mentioned. Familiarity is an essential element in it. A man who knows what it is like for something to be red is capable of recognising the colour red when he encounters it again in other instances.
This is the usage I have myself adopted so far. Where we say 'Smith believes p', 'J ones believed q until yesterday', the letters p and q are what logicians call variables, and the values of these variables are propositions. But we also speak sometimes of believing a person. He told me that there would be muffins for tea, and I believed him. Alas! there was only buttered toast. It may be that in the history of language this 'personal' usage is the earlier one. Nevertheless, it seems to be logically derivative.
Belief (Muirhead Library of Philosophy) by Henry Habberley Price