By Jerry A. Fodor
The popular thinker Jerry Fodor, a number one determine within the research of the brain for greater than 20 years, provides a strikingly unique conception at the simple ingredients of suggestion. He means that the guts of cognitive technology is its conception of thoughts, and that cognitive scientists have long gone badly unsuitable in lots of components simply because their assumptions approximately techniques were unsuitable. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic idea of techniques, offers out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival theories, and means that destiny paintings on human cognition may still construct upon new foundations.
This full of life, conversational, and beautifully available publication is the 1st quantity within the Oxford Cognitive technology sequence, the place the easiest unique paintings during this box should be offered to a extensive readership. Concepts will fascinate somebody attracted to modern paintings on brain and language. Cognitive technological know-how seriously is not an analogous again.
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Additional info for Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong
So my question can be put just in terms of the latter: that one has as many ways of thinking of a referent as one has concepts of the referent depends on there being just one way to entertain each concept. What, beside stipulation, guarantees this? Perhaps the following analogy (actually quite close, I think) will help to make the situation clear. There are lots of cases where things other, and less problematic, than Fregean senses might reasonably be described as ‘modes of presentation’; viz. as being used to present the object of a thought to the thought that it’s the object of.
The difference is this: It is surely plausible on the face of it that ‘instantiating property P ’ is just being P; being red is all that there is to instantiating redness. But MOP is a technical notion in want of a metaphysics. If, as seems likely, the identity of a mental state turns on its causal role, then if MOPs are to individuate mental states they will have to be the sorts of things that the causal role of a mental state can turn on. But it’s a mystery how a MOP could be that sort of thing if MOPs aren’t in the head.
He can’t, however, get one just by wanting it; he has to explain how there could be such things. 3 is in his way. I think that if MOPs can individuate concepts and referents can’t, that must be because MOPs are mental objects and referents aren’t. e. 13 Suppose that MOPs are in fact so distinguished. Then it’s hardly surprising that there is only one way a mind can entertain each MOP: since, on this ontological assumption, functionally equivalent MOPs are ipso facto identical, the question ‘Which MOP are you 13 This doesn’t, please notice, commit me to holding that the individuation of thought content is functional.
Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong by Jerry A. Fodor