Epistemology

Contrastive reasons by Justin Snedegar PDF

By Justin Snedegar

ISBN-10: 0191089036

ISBN-13: 9780191089039

ISBN-10: 0198785933

ISBN-13: 9780198785934

Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism approximately purposes. this can be the view that normative purposes are essentially purposes for or opposed to activities or attitudes merely relative to units of choices. easily placed, purposes are continuously purposes to do something instead of one other, rather than easily being purposes to do whatever, complete cease. paintings on purposes has turn into principal to numerous parts of philosophy, but Read more...

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Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism approximately purposes. this can be the view that normative purposes are essentially purposes for or opposed to activities or attitudes in basic terms relative to units of Read more...

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Here’s how to capture resolution sensitivity. If the alternatives in Q are divided up at a lower level of resolution than the options in the original ranking are—so that my reasons rank the options at a higher resolution than the resolution at which I deliberate between them—we group them in the obvious way. For example, if I’m deliberating between putting more than ten gallons of gas in the car and putting ten gallons or less in, the alternatives will be grouped in that way: {put in  gallons or less, put in more than  gallons}.

The first conjunct, though, is non-contrastive, while the second is explicitly contrastive. If the single occurrence of ‘reason’ latches on to both conjuncts, that is evidence that ‘reason’ is univocal, whether it takes a contrastive or a non-contrastive complement. While this test is not conclusive, it does give us some good evidence that ‘reason’ is not ambiguous between a contrastive and a non-contrastive sense.  Ruling out the ambiguity view, though, does not yet establish contrastivism. We can still try to offer non-contrastive analyses of explicitly contrastive reason ascriptions like () and ().

But all of these things just look like explanations of the relevant facts. One idea is that explanatory reasons are part of the explanation for some fact. The explanation for why I’m sunburnt is that I forgot to put on sunscreen and I stayed in the direct sunlight for a long time and my skin has certain properties and . . Each of these individual parts of the explanation might be an explanatory reason; each explanatory reason contributes to the full explanation. The problem with this, though, is that when we cite explanatory reasons we simply seem to be giving explanations: saying ‘The reason why I’m sunburnt is that I forgot to put on sunscreen’ seems to be the same as saying ‘The explanation for why I’m sunburnt is that I forgot to put on sunscreen’.

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Contrastive reasons by Justin Snedegar


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